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RÉSUMÉ
Vue comme résultat de l’application des technologies réduisant les coûts reliés aux com-
munications, la mondialisation favorise à la fois le recours massif à l’anglais, lingua 
franca, et l’accroissement de la demande des traductions. Ce paradoxe apparent s’expli-
que par la dichotomie entre les stratégies de production, d’une part, et les modes de 
diffusion des informations, d’autre part. Or, c’est la diffusion, et elle seulement, qui donne 
son caractère pérenne à la traduction. La nouveauté essentielle de la mondialisation est 
parfaitement illustrée dans la localisation multiple à partir d’un matériau internationalisé 
(géométrie de l’« un-à-plusieurs »), là où autrefois on travaillait suivant le modèle une 
source-une cible, encore le plus étudié par la traductologie. La discipline qui étudie la 
traduction s’organise pourtant autour d’un ensemble de principes politiques qui, tout en 
restant fi dèles au binarisme source-cible, pourraient redéfi nir la traductologie dans le 
contexte mondialisant. Parmi ces principes, relevons l’organisation des formations enca-
drée par des plans nationaux ou régionaux, la défense des cultures minoritaires, et l’in-
vestissement dans l’altérité culturelle. La pertinence même de ces principes est examinée 
dans les pages qui suivent à la lumière de trois états de fait : le manque relatif de recher-
ches américaines sur la traduction, l’organisation d’une association internationale des 
traductologues, et le rejet des boycottages nationalistes à l’endroit des chercheurs. 
ABSTRACT
Globalization can be seen as a consequence of technologies reducing the costs of com-
munication. This reduction has led both to the rise of English as the international lingua 
franca and to an increase in the global demand for translations. The simultaneous move-
ment on both fronts is explained by the divergent communication strategies informing 
the production and distribution of information, where translation can only be expected 
to remain signifi cant for distribution, and not for production. The fundamental change 
in the resulting communication patterns is the emergence of one-to-many document 
production processes, which are displacing the traditional source-target models still used 
in Translation Studies. Translation Studies might nevertheless retain a set of political 
principles that could constitute its own identity with respect to globalization. Such prin-
ciples would be expressed in the national and regional organization of the discipline, in 
the defense of minority cultures, and in a general stake in cultural alterity. The possible 
existence of such principles is here examined on the basis of three instances where 
Translation Studies might address globalization in political terms: the weakness of the 
discipline in dominant monocultures, the development of an international association of 
Translation Studies, and political boycotts of translation scholars.
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Here we shall attempt to model globalization as an economic process that has certain 
consequences for the social role of translation. Those consequences will then be seen 
as affecting the political organization of Translation Studies as a scholarly discipline. 
The general economic process is held to have certain elements of irreversibility thanks 
to its grounding in technological change. Translators will mostly have to come to 
terms with those elements, as will scholars and everyone else. There are, however, 
properly political processes that build on globalization but should not be identifi ed 
with it. Those processes also have consequences for translation, but they are not to be 
considered inevitable. Some of them can be resisted or infl uenced by the use or non-
use of translation. Those political processes can be indirectly affected by a scholarly 
Translation Studies, which might thus develop its own politics with respect to globa-
lization. This means that Translation Studies should seek to understand and explain 
the effects of globalization, without pretending to resist them all. At the same time, it 
should attempt to infl uence the more negative political processes within its reach, 
developing political agendas and cultivating its own political organization. In this, the 
dialectics play out between the technological and the political, between the things we 
must live with and the things we should try to change. Only with this double vision 
should we attempt to take a position with respect to globalization. 
The Technological
Globalization, for our present purposes, results from a progressive reduction in the 
costs of communication and transport. The term can mean many other things as well; 
the current theories cover everything from the state of markets to the condition of 
the soul. But for us, here, globalization will be no more than a set of things that can 
happen when distance becomes easier to conquer. Let us model those things. Let us 
try to connect them with translation and its study. 
Here is one model. As technology improves, we can move things further and more 
effi ciently, just as we can potentially communicate more effi ciently and over greater 
stretches of time and space. What is reduced on both these levels might be called the 
transaction costs, understood as the total effort necessary just to get the objects moved 
or the communication under way. Different technologies structure these costs in dif-
ferent ways. Sometimes apparently slight changes can have large-scale effects. The 
technological move from parchment to paper, for example, cheapened rewriting 
processes, enabling translations with multiple revisions, greater teamwork and wider 
distribution. Not by chance, the arrival of paper coincided with the signifi cant trans-
lation activities in Baghdad in the ninth and tenth centuries, and with those in 
Hispania in the twelfth and thirteenth (see Pym 2000a). Similarly, the printing press 
enabled much wider distribution, at the same time as it required the fi xing of a 
defi nitive text. This led to spelling conventions and the standardization of national 
languages, while the ideally defi nitive text promoted greater awareness of individual-
ist discourse (the style of the author), with corresponding calls for individualist 
translators. The age of print was also that of national languages and the individual 
translator, as well as the ideal of equivalence (since there was a technologically fi xed 
text to which a rendition could be equivalent). And what now of our electronic means 
of communication? They are mostly cheaper still, allowing transaction costs to be 
structured in quite different ways. Revision practices are no longer an addition to 
translation; they have become essential to text production (websites are constantly 
updated) and for translation as an extension of that process. The kind of equivalence 
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promoted by the printing press is no longer pertinent when the source texts are con-
stantly evolving by electronic means. Underlying those conceptual ruptures, however, 
the general reduction of transaction costs has been going on for centuries. 
What consequences might that extended process have for the way translation 
interacts with globalization, up to and including our electronic age? With cursory 
glances at recent history, a certain chain of reasoning can be linked as follows: 
– As transport and communication become cheaper, more things are moved and com-
municated over greater distances. This hypothesis is in accordance with the assumed 
benefi ts of trade and the unhappy supposition that people tend to do everything that 
technology makes it possible for them to do. As precarious as the hypothesis might be 
in human terms, the statistics for global transport and communications do indicate an 
accelerating rise. 
– There is thus more communication. This is not only because it is easier to communicate 
but also because there are more moving things about which to communicate, more 
possible communication partners to talk with, more possibilities for communication 
about the resulting communication, and indeed more technology to talk about in the 
fi rst place. Did we ever imagine, prior to email and mobile phones, that so much needed 
to be said? 
– The quantitative rise in communication is fi rst within the borders of cultures and lan-
guages (since there is less resistance from cultural and linguistic differences), then 
progressively across those borders. 
– When communication regularly crosses the borders of languages and cultures, it tends 
to wash away those same borders. Thus were the local patois and fi efdoms swamped by 
the vernaculars and nation states. Thus, also, are the nation states and their languages 
transformed into parts of greater regions. And so, too, have the regions formed into 
intercontinental markets with a growing lingua franca. The end of that process would 
be communication on a truly planetary scale. Prior to that point, however, globalization 
is not global; it is a convenient misnomer for an incomplete development. 
– Globalization thus creates the need for common languages, therefore the need for fewer 
languages, and now the need for just one lingua franca, English.
– As the borders are washed away, so too is the need for translation. We will soon all speak 
English all the time, so the whole translation profession is doomed to extinction. 
Translation Studies will lose its object, and we might as well face up to the fact. Such are 
the consequences of technology. 
There is a lot wrong with that model, and not just because its conclusion is sad. The 
model can be used to reduce globalization to cultural homogenization, to McDonalds 
and Coca Cola and Microsoft ruling the world, as is done often enough. Globalization 
quickly becomes a process to be resisted, as if there were an enemy somewhere con-
stantly pulling the strings, as if there were always causal connections being manipu-
lated, as if we faced a for-or-against situation of some kind, as if there were no 
technology at the base of change. In need of opposition, some would occasionally try 
to read the model in reverse, courageously hoping the evils of globalization can be 
countered by politically promoting languages, by increasing the number of transla-
tions, or simply by translating differently (cf. the “call to action” in Venuti 1995). The 
tide advances, Canute retreats; so if Canute advances, the tide will retreat? Here are a 
handful of reasons why those simple cause-and-effect models fail: 
– Despite the tragic decline in the number of the world’s living languages, the number of 
translations would so far seem to have increased with similar drama. Yes, increased. 
Boucau (2005: 9), working from a wide range of business sources, states that the global 
translation market has grown rapidly in the past 20 years and puts the current growth 
rate at between 5 and 7.5% per year. A longer constant increase can be found in the 
Index Translationum since 1932 (under the auspices of UNESCO since 1948, computer-
ized since 1979). All the numbers indicate a constant rise in the numbers of translations 
carried out in the world; we are aware of no numbers that intimate a fall. This rise would 
be alongside (not opposed to) the growth of international English. Globalization would 
seem to promote both the lingua franca and the demand for translations. If we cannot 
explain this apparent paradox, then perhaps we are not grasping globalization. Our acts 
of political resistance are likely to be well meant, well reasoned, politically correct, and 
poorly aimed. 
– The real and tragic decline in the number and diversity of the world’s living languages 
probably has more to do with urbanization. The same technologies that restructure 
transaction costs also bring people in from plains and down from mountains, in a way 
that is not easily reversible by means of mere communication. 
– Globalization, in our technological sense, mostly affects the discourses where the tech-
nology for cross-cultural transport and communication is actually used. Many parts of 
our lives are not subject to it in any radical way; our loves, hates and dreams often 
proceed virtually untouched, as do local and national politics, for example. Globalization 
is by no means the only narrative in town. As Brian Mossop correctly pointed out at the 
Halifax conference, state-fi nanced translations across Canada’s offi cial bilingualism are 
affected by technology and transaction costs, yet they by no means conform to general 
models of globalization. Other histories are also working themselves out. Globalization 
is not global, nor need it be. 
– Those discourses that are affected quite probably change much more than the simple 
quantities would suggest. The production of technology and global services moves the 
very places from which discourses are initiated and elaborated. And that, above all, is 
what we have to try to understand and explain. 
These objections should produce a slightly more complex view. Globalization is 
neither the friend nor the foe of translation. It is quite simply changing many of the 
situations in which translation is called upon to operate. And it is doing so on a 
technological level that involves elements of irreversibility. Translation scholars should 
be able to grasp and respond to that process. 
How is it that the numbers of translations might increase at the same time as 
English triumphs and many languages are forced into twilight? This is what I have 
elsewhere termed the “diversity paradox”. By rights, growing use of the lingua franca 
should be reducing cultural diversity, whereas the use of translation should be main-
taining the same diversity. So how can the two processes occur at the same time? How 
exactly could globalization lead both to an international lingua franca and to a rise 
in the market for translations?
The answer to this must lie in the increasing differences between the economic 
categories of production and distribution. 
The effect of globalization on production can broadly be seen as an extension of 
Ricardan trade, creating centers of international specialization. Portugal was (and still 
is) good at producing wine; Britain was better (at that time) at manufacturing cloth, 
so it was theoretically preferable for each to specialize and for systematic trade to 
result. Globalization, promoting quantitative increase in international trade, should 
allow further specialization of this kind, and thus greater regional diversity. Any neo-
classical economist will tell you that international trade promotes specialization in 
production, not global homogeneity. There is much evidence in support of that view. 
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We tend not to complain about globalization when our port comes from Porto, our 
scotch from Scotland, our fi lms from Hollywood or Bollywood or Cairo, our suits 
from Italy, our software programs from the west coast of the United States, or indeed 
our software localization from Ireland. Regional specialization is not hard to fi nd; it 
would be much harder to argue that globalization allows everything to be produced 
everywhere.
This diversity-through-trade argument should probably help us explain why 
translation is still very necessary. Products have to be moved from the specialized 
places in which they are produced; their information thus has to cross linguistic and 
cultural borders; documents have to be translated. 
Much as Ricardan economics was good for the early nineteenth century, it 
requires adaptation before it can say much about our own situation. Let us suggest 
three modifi cations: 
– The main point to add is quite obvious. The regional diversity gained on the level of 
trade is progressively lost on the level of distribution. One consequence of specialized 
production is greater homogeneity in consumption. Economists tend to privilege pro-
duction (as indeed do linguists); cultural critics are usually more worried about the 
globalization of distribution. The main point is that the regional confi gurations of the 
two levels are now remarkably different. How does this concern translation? For a start, 
the cultural distances between the points of production and consumption have been 
stretched to extremes, requiring enormous amounts of communication, some of which 
is translational.
– The second point should also be easy enough. Few of the classical theories envisaged 
the places of production and consumption as being anything other than nation states 
or regions, where internal cultural diversity would not disturb the boxes where the 
statistics sat. That is no longer the case. Production is usually specialized on a scale 
smaller than the nation state (except for small states like the Caribbean island of 
Grenada, which is the world’s second largest exporter of nutmeg). We tend to talk about 
a productive focus defi ned by local geographies or, in the case of technological produc-
tion, the human and fi nancial resources networked in cities. Production is eminently 
local, often surprisingly so. It develops centers of specialization in the very face of 
political calls for decentralization, and despite the technological possibilities for a more 
international networking of the relations of production. In the age of globalization, 
production is certainly not global in any homogenizing sense. People still need to see 
each other from time to time, to inhabit the same air, to partake of a localized produc-
tion culture. What does this have to do with translation? Well, for instance, why is it that 
the translators working exclusively through the Internet struggle to fi nd clients and must 
fi ght to keep them? Why do translators themselves form companies and cooperatives 
where they can meet with each other face to face? Indeed, in the age of electronic com-
munication, why do we have the largest centralized translation bureau in the world, in 
Brussels-Luxembourg (admittedly split in two, in shameless lip-service to decentraliza-
tion, and with a wide dispersed fringe of freelancers). Such nodes tend to be located 
near the centers of production (in the case of Brussels let us allow that political decisions 
are produced). In all of this, the human values of contact have much to say, particularly 
in view of the key role played by trust in the translator’s interpersonal relations. Yet there 
is still more. 
– Perhaps the main modifi cation to be made to Ricardan diversity-through-trade is that 
language and communication technologies must now be seen as integral parts of the 
means of production. When the wine had to fl ow to Britain and the cloth had to unfold 
in Portugal, some kind of English-Portuguese translation was theoretically needed for 
the contact situation. The language interface was a minor transaction cost that had to 
be covered by the benefi ts of trade. However, once we are actually producing language 
and communication (as does the Brussels eurocracy, for example), language and com-
munication technologies start to confi gure the very places of production. Such places 
need not correspond to the presumed primacy of nation states, regions, or anything 
other than the relations of production themselves. For Ricardan economics, port wine 
is produced in Portugal because that is where they do it for the least expenditure of 
labor. On the other hand, much computer programming tends to be done in technical 
varieties of English because that is the language most adapted to the task, no matter 
where the actual production is carried out. In the latter case, which is the kind of global-
ization most in tune with an electronic age, language and communication help form 
the place of production. People become increasingly able to participate in relations of 
production independently of the cultures and languages that they previously had, and 
independently of the culture and language operative in the country where they work. 
The move from the fi rst model (language and communication as additional trade costs) 
to the second (language and communication as forming relations of production) may 
be of little importance in many fi elds. Yet it assumes radical proportions in the domains 
of production most affected by technology, particularly communications technology. 
After all, those are the fi elds where the decrease in transaction costs has most impact. 
The important point about the revised model, the one where language and com-
munication actually enter the relations of production, is that the confi guration of 
production can be radically different from the tendency to homogenization operative 
on the level of distribution. 
Only that revised model can really explain the prolonged vitality of translation. 
Only that model can see languages as playing one role in production and quite another 
in distribution. To put it in a reductive nutshell, the lingua franca plays its global role 
as a factor of production, whereas translation plays its marketing role as a tool of 
distribution. On this view, translation into the languages of production should be 
fundamentally different, in general, from translation from those languages. And that 
asymmetry is so basic and so powerful that little resistance seems called for. 
To tell the same story again: 
Let us suppose that the economies of globalization centralize production in the 
fi elds most affected by technology. In those fi elds, knowledge is increasingly produced 
and circulated in the lingua franca. We know that major multinationals use English 
as their default language, even when they have been set up in Germany or Finland. 
The technical discourses thus produced in English circulate among the productive 
locales in English, reaching the knowledge community wherever it may exist, without 
need of translation. In that respect, international English would be operating like the 
international Latin of the medieval period, facilitating numerous exchanges and 
potentially democratizing the production of knowledge. If you want to do science, 
you learn English, just as all scholars once had to learn Latin. This is not necessarily 
a bad thing. Nor, obviously, is it an entirely new phenomenon. 
Within those spheres of production, translation tends to play a marginal role. For 
example, scholars with weak English may seek to have their papers published in that 
language and will require translation accordingly. Yet even that role is diminishing. 
The translator working from, say, Catalan into English would now more probably be 
called upon to revise the Catalan scientist’s draft already written in English. To do so 
is simply more effi cient, given that the specialist is more in command of the technical 
discourse in English than is the generalist translator. Thanks to the same logic, we 
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fi nd that the English section of the European Commission’s Translation Service is 
becoming a group of scribes, offi cial rewriters, rather than translators in any strict 
language-into-language sense. 
The picture is quite different if we now consider the linguistic demands operative 
in the distribution of products. Globalization moves things, trade increases, and 
innumerable products reach consumers who do not share the language and culture 
of the producers. Here we fi nd that translation is not only increasing, but that it is 
changing its key concepts. In the industries most given to marketing in local lan-
guages, the reigning concept tends to be “localization” (very loosely seen as translation 
plus cultural adaptation). More important than the names, however, are a few key 
changes in discursive production:
– Whereas translation is still thought of in terms of language-into-language situations, 
where is it meaningful to talk about “source” and “target”, globalized distribution oper-
ates on the basis of a one-to-many geometry, which is a fundamentally different way of 
working. We fi nd centralized production of the one “internationalized” text or product, 
which is basically a source text that has had as many as possible source-culture elements 
removed. The resulting internationalized version is then more effi ciently “localized” 
(translated and adapted) to a wide range of consumer environments (“locales”).
– In the one-to-many scenario, time becomes an essential feature of discursive success 
conditions. This can be seen in the ideals of the simultaneous shipment of new products, 
where a translation may be correct but is not operative if it arrives late. It is also a feature 
of translation services in multilingual bureaucracies. 
– The sheer size of most one-to-many communication projects means there is an increase 
in the hierarchical control and standardization of translation. “Localization” may super-
fi cially mean “translation plus adaptation”, but these two aspects are increasingly sepa-
rated. The various translation-memory programs and localization tools restrict the 
translator’s decisions, returning strict translation to the paradigm of phrase-level 
equivalence, and leaving adaptation to specialists in marketing or engineering. 
The basic one-to-many geometry by no means covers all translation situations. 
It nevertheless successfully accounts for the diversity paradox in ways that translation 
between source and target cannot. In the fi elds most subject to globalization, transla-
tion into English is signifi cantly different, in its power relations if nothing else, from 
localization from English. And the terminological shift from “translation” to “localiza-
tion” maps onto those different directionalities fairly well. This is a major change that 
Translation Studies has been very late in perceiving. Our discipline is still largely 
reluctant to convert it into properly theoretical concepts. 
The discourse of localization has come from the industry itself, most notably from 
the fi elds of software, web-based e-commerce and international information services. 
Translation Studies has tended not to see those changes, even though the importance 
of one-to-many geometries was noted quite some time ago (notably in Lambert 1989). 
This is perhaps because our sights have more traditionally been set on the prestigious 
international organizations where translation is still thought of in more traditional 
ways. Entities like the United Nations and the European Union depend on translation 
for their very functioning, and do so according to a model of ideally symmetrical rights 
for offi cial languages. In that world, the language-into-language model is still supposed 
to work, even when the technologies and economies say otherwise. The legal fi ctions 
of many protectionist language policies are also extremely convenient for many of the 
ideologies that circulate in Translation Studies, most notably for the binary models 
we use for the act of translation itself. There are more than 5,000 intergovernmental 
organizations operative in today’s world (see the annual Yearbook of International 
Organizations); most of them adopt some kind of bilingual or multilingual policy, if 
only to please the governments they depend on. (Note, though, that there are almost 
fi ve times as many international non-governmental organizations, whose main prefer-
ence is for the relative effi ciencies of monolingualism.)
This situation suggests that Translation Studies has some kind of intuitive inter-
est in certain models of translation. Perhaps more exactly, Translation Studies has a 
certain allegiance to situations and organizations in which translation reigns supreme, 
without subordination to lingua francas, language learning, or tight budgetary con-
straints on communications. This makes a certain sense, since Translation Studies 
comprises scholars who choose to study translation rather than economics or general 
communication. It also makes a kind of intuitive sense when we witness the relative 
ease with which the cross-cultural ethical ideals of Berman or Venuti, for example, 
are accepted within the research community as being beyond reproach, and indeed 
as extending beyond the narrow literary domain. Few feel any need to calculate those 
ideals in economic terms, to relate them to technological history, or even to question 
the facile assumptions of source vs. target. 
Our purpose here is not to pull apart that political correctness, nor to propose our 
own. We are instead intrigued by the possibility that, perhaps without knowing it, and 
despite all our internal divisions, the very idea of Translation Studies presupposes 
adherence to certain fundamental principles. Those would be the principles that are 
easily accepted when formulated; they would be the ones considered too evident to 
challenge. Such principles would surely be the basis for some kind of political identity. 
They could also constitute a fundamental reason for our general failure to conceptual-
ize the consequences of globalization, particularly the one-to-many geometry and the 
ways in which the patterns of production and distribution have diverged. Our disci-
pline struggles to perceive the contexts in which its own politics have developed. 
The Political 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are people who work in the over-
laps of cultures. This does not mean these people are somehow without culture, nor 
that they are in any way universal or a-historical, nor at an ideal mid-point, nor 
immobile, without allegiances, nor any such pap. There are simply people whose 
professions require that they know and operate in more than one cultural frame at 
once. Further, the people we are particularly interested in know and operate on 
exchanges between cultures. These are the people who move things across language 
boundaries, who negotiate the fi ne print of treaties, who produce our transnational 
news and entertainment, who surround our lives with a million products received in 
cultures different from the ones they were produced in. Such would be the people 
of professional intercultures: translators, diplomats, traders, negotiators, technicians 
manipulating complex codes, when and wherever products and their texts cross 
cultural boundaries. 
Such people exist. You and I might even be among their number, as might our 
multilingual students. The question here is not just who we are, but what we stand 
for and how we should act. Those aspects can scarcely be separated. 
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What does it mean to act politically? On the face of it, the phrase would involve 
actions infl uencing relations between people, particularly the loyalties and alliances 
that form power and direct its fl ows. The political pronoun is certainly “we”, variously 
inclusive or exclusive. To act politically, in the intercultural fi eld, might thus mean 
siding with one culture or the other, or with one aspect of a culture against another, 
to some degree or another, for one reason or another. I have suggested elsewhere that 
there are ethical ways of thinking about such acts, without assuming allegiance by 
birthright or pay-role. It is enough for the intercultural subject to seek long-term 
cooperation between cultures, or to start reasoning from there (cf. Pym 2000b). 
Although sweepingly general, this precept is not adequate to all occasions. How, for 
instance, should it be applied to problems where what is at stake is the identity of 
Translation Studies, the constitution of a scholarly intercultural “we”? 
Where, for example, do “we” stand with respect to globalization? Our research 
community, perhaps a few hundred people, possibly with several hundred more look-
ing on, is surely too small to seek comparison. Our professional intercultures only 
loosely resemble those in which production is now specialized; our key productive 
locations are only in some cases next to centers of capitalist production. Thanks in 
part to academic distance, we do not particularly follow the orders of either produc-
tion or distribution. That is certainly one of the reasons why we fail to keep abreast 
of the way those systems are developing. It is perhaps also why we tend to maintain 
allegiance to the ideals of former models, believing in translation and national bound-
aries even when production systems have no great need of either. At the same time, 
that academic distance might also be why we risk having little of currency to say, or 
too little power for our voice to be heard. 
One can only test those hypotheses on the basis of concrete situations. Here we 
will briefl y consider three cases in which our politics meet globalization. 
Empires
Translation Studies tends to be proportionally strong in the smaller cultures where 
translation plays a quantitatively signifi cant role (here we are thinking of cases like 
Belgium, Holland, Israel, Finland, Catalonia, Galicia, Quebec). This is no rule, but it 
helps explain why our perspectives often concern the defense of minority cultures, 
the use of general models of cultural alterity (one side facing the other), and a certain 
intuitive focus on distribution rather than production (cf. the target-side episte-
mologies of Descriptive Translation Studies and Skopostheorie). A worrying correlative 
of this is the relative weakness of Translation Studies in the larger monolingual coun-
tries where political power tends to accrue, most notably in the United States. We 
might thus venture that Translation Studies tends to form its intercultures in situa-
tions where alterity is already operative as a feature of distribution. That would be 
where its politics develop. That is also the place from where one looks at production 
systems, at the centralized intercultures where English reigns, and feigns to fi nd the 
enemy of translation. 
As we have argued, that vision is short-sighted. It confuses the technological with 
the political. What it tends to see, instead of globalization, is politics of a superpower 
that has unusually limited awareness of minor cultures, supranational organizations, 
or virtually any of the things that translation might stand for in our traditional vision. 
In recent years the United States has virtually done away with any pretense to inter-
national law. Treaties have been revoked, wars have been initiated on the weakest of 
excuses, international human-rights conventions are violated on a daily basis, inter-
national courts are seen as fi ne ideas only for as long as no US citizen will be subject 
to them. Translation is an essential element of the institutions that are thus being 
fl outed. When right is decided unilaterally, without need for consultation or negotia-
tion, or when the consultations and negotiations are simply ignored because they do 
not reach the right conclusion, then the need for translation is obviated and our object 
of study will indeed serve little purpose. That scenario is to be resisted. It is not to be 
mapped onto the inevitabilities of globalization. 
To be even blunter: in our small academic political acts, we have before us at least 
two possible models of contemporary empire. One, in Europe, incorporates transla-
tion into its very principles, becoming what one analyst calls the world’s fi rst post-
modern and potentially cooperative empire (Cooper 2003: 78-79). The other, in the 
United States, ignores many of the virtues to which translation might hope to con-
tribute, remaining modernist in its insistence on nation. The fi rst kind of empire gains 
admirable fl exibility, defending its borders by extending them, just as its weak inner 
identity makes it unsuited to any risk-ridden action in the world. The second kind of 
empire has the unity and force needed for action; it provides international relations 
with its only real hope of power-based stability; yet it sadly underrates the diversity 
of human cultures. 
What should Translation Studies be doing in such a situation? Within Europe, 
much work is needed to improve effi ciencies and to fi nd ways to combine translation 
with the use of lingua francas, transcending the jealousies of the nation states. Our 
key task, however, should be with respect to the more powerful empire, the United 
States. In that latter context, translation has remained virtually excluded from the 
agenda of Critical Theory; it is a straggler in the league of Cultural Studies; it is 
attached as an adjunct to training in interpreting or occasionally as an application of 
Literary Studies; there is lamentably little connection with anything like the global 
confi guration of cultures; and although all scholars in the humanities have an opinion 
on translation, very few approach it an as object of study. Sincere praise should be 
given to the Americans who have fought against this tendency: Marilyn Gaddis Rose, 
Lawrence Venuti, Douglas Robinson, Edwin Gentzler, Maria Tymoczko, to name a few 
of the most prominent. Yet they remain isolated voices, in what seems a sea of indif-
ference and incomprehension. They should not, I hope, be isolated as merely 
American voices. The search for a greater resonance within the institutions of the 
United States should be a task for our wider identity, not just for the repetition of 
national divisions. 
What is to be done? Publish and speak in the United States, in the discourses 
fashionable in the United States, no matter where you are from. Extend Translation 
Studies to the centers of intellectual production.
I work in a small English Department in Spain. My colleagues who work in 
Literary and Cultural Studies do not consider translation a full-fl edged legitimate 
object of study. They take their operative concepts and agendas from the United 
States. 
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An association
Perhaps the clearest sign of our décalage with respect to globalization is the extent to 
which Translation Studies remains organized along national lines. Our academic 
discipline has generally ridden on the back of translator-training institutions, either 
directly or indirectly, and those institutions mostly operate within national education 
systems. Even beyond the concerns of translator training, however, the political orga-
nization of Translation Studies has largely been oriented along national lines. The 
Canadian Association of Translation Studies might be an example of this, as could 
similar associations in the United States, Brazil and Japan (for interpreting). There 
are also associations that run across national boundaries, such as the European Society 
for Translation Studies and the Iberian association that brings together Spain and 
Portugal. But why should all these associations have remained geopolitically national 
or regional? 
One could argue that the problems of translation are fundamentally different in 
different geopolitical contexts. The offi cial bilingualism of Canada creates a highly 
specifi c fi eld that wholly justifi es a certain approach to translation, along with a 
 certain restriction to French and English. In Europe, the future of translation is 
undoubtedly marked by the language practices (there is no communication policy) 
of the European Union, which creates a series of quite different problems. The justi-
fi cation for the Iberian association is a little harder to fathom, although it might 
legitimately spring from a sense of being excluded by other European discourses on 
translation. The education systems are still organized along national lines; national 
governments still have language and communication policies that we might be able 
to inform; there are still national and regional subsidies to apply for. There is thus 
still a level at which certain translation problems, particularly with respect to profes-
sional status, require a nationally based approach. If one looks hard enough, one can 
fi nd reasons for a certain political organization at quite small geo-political levels. 
Indeed, I would personally like to see more work along local lines, with what anthro-
pologists call local knowledge, and a little less adulation of the international stars of 
Translation Studies. The prime reason for this is the general failure of Translation 
Studies, more than 30 years after James S. Holmes (1972) coined the name and 
mapped the discipline, has produced almost no intellectual product of direct benefi t 
to the translation profession on any international level. The most signifi cant contribu-
tion to the profession has perhaps been the development of translation memory 
software, and that has not happened within Translation Studies. On the other hand, 
our waves of theorizing and the building up of a body of empirical knowledge can 
and has been of direct use in translator training. But the transfer of that knowledge 
has been far from international. Indeed there was long a problematic lack of enlight-
ened international textbooks and journals accessible to the teaching institutions. The 
transfer of knowledge from research to teaching has very largely been at the national 
or regional level, with signifi cant differences often ensuing from the nature of the 
education systems involved. For that reason, the development of Translation Studies 
at national levels might even be considered appropriate to the specifi cities of at least 
that part of the discipline’s tasks. 
On the other hand, despite the imperatives of transfer, the actual studies we 
produce tend to refl ect remarkably little geopolitical bias. As the initial language 
 differences are reduced (for example, the initial development of Skopostheorie in 
German), publications like Meta, TTR, or Target are nowadays different not because 
of where they are printed but because of the academic preferences of individual 
 editors and their committees. Some journals want to be closer to practice, others more 
empirical, and still others cherish the legacy of linguistics. The same authors tend to 
appear in all; much the same methodologies are used, regardless of the regional 
 context. No matter how much the actual problems of translation might depend on 
national contexts, no matter how much the demands for transfer are local, the 
research problems of Translation Studies would seem to be rather more global.
This is as it should be. As professional associations, we tend to come together not 
because we are similar in any iconic or legalistic way (with regard to race, language, 
citizenship or whatever) but precisely because we are of diverse provenance, each 
bringing different expertise and experience with regard to languages, cultures and 
research methodologies. That is what intercultures are all about. We need those dif-
ferences not just because of our declared status as an interdiscipline but more espe-
cially by virtue of the nature of translation itself, which assumes knowledge of a 
cultural other. As an academic discipline, we are given to straddling cultural borders, 
engaging our dialogues beyond the national, constructing our own particular forms 
of interculturality. Further, thanks to our academic non-conformity with globaliza-
tion, those general principles have no reason to be restricted to the centers of produc-
tion. Our intercultures could and should embrace interested scholars from all cultures, 
no matter how small or far-fl ung, or rather, particularly from those that work in 
minority situations and struggle against geophysical distance. For those reasons, our 
professional associations should be operating at a global level, in addition to the work 
they do at the national and regional levels.
There is no excuse for the long absence of a truly international association of 
Translation Studies. We should thus welcome the creation of the International 
Association of Translation and Intercultural Studies (IATIS) in 2004. This should have 
been achieved by federating the existing national and regional associations, thus 
 creating some kind of global unity. As it happened, the international association was 
an independent start-up, created in order to integrate the many peripheral situations 
apparently excluded by the previously existing associations. That is a noble and 
 necessary aim. In this, again, we see the propensity of Translation Studies to defend 
the local, the particular, the minor, even from the perspective of its most willfully 
globalized association. 
A boycott
Here is another political act that worries me. I am asked to sign a petition calling for 
the boycott of “research and cultural” links with citizens of a particular country. That 
country has acted illegally, inhumanely, atrociously, as far as I can tell. So too has the 
country I was born in. Even worse is the colonial record of the country whose passport 
I now carry. The petition asks me to identify researchers and artists with the state they 
work within. To act politically would be to make this identifi cation, in the hope they 
will then pressure that state from within, or something like that. Unfortunately, not 
signing the petition is denied status as a political act; no one has invited me to sign a 
document expressing solidarity with all those who condemn their state’s actions. This 
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one-sidedness is the fi rst reason for considering the act a problem. How many alterna-
tives does the political act give us? 
Here is yet another political act that worries me. The editor of the journal The 
Translator dismissed members from the editorial board because of the country their 
universities are in, using the same general reasoning as above. In this case, though, 
the one-sidedness is not as much a problem, since there has been much discussion of 
the act within Translation Studies.
Here we see that the national principle can be used not only to organize 
Translation Studies, as has so far been the case in our organizations, but also to 
exclude some translation scholars. That is nationalism in reverse. It runs counter to 
the interests of Translation Studies on almost every level imaginable. It divides the 
international research community; it does so with respect to issues that do not con-
cern translation; it cannot lead to any increased cooperation between cultures. 
Such historical tests are nevertheless instructive. They sometimes allow us to 
discover the principles that we did not know we had. The almost general rejection of 
the nationalist exclusion should be seen as a reaction not just against something that 
is felt to be wrong, but as an affi rmation of what is instinctively right: the international 
community of scholars working together to solve the problems of their fi eld. Thus 
might we discover that our professional relations are more important than our 
 passports or personal opinions about foreign states. We could fi nd that the interdis-
cipline requires dialogue across real difference, rather than the imposition of political 
certitude. In short, we might discover our status as a particular kind of professional 
interculture, as a community that operates beyond the primary allegiances of birth-
right, employment, or party politics. 
To be sure, awareness of those fundamental principles has been obscured by the 
inept way in which this debate was initiated, with arguments fi t more for the glassy-
eyed convictions of an English pub. The issue, for me, was long clouded by barrages 
of insulting email from various pressure groups, demonstrating the power of manip-
ulated opinion. It has more recently been complicated by occasional insults being 
thrown at the intellectual community for its failure to support the boycott. The dis-
paraging tone of those asides indicates not only real and justifi ed despair, but a severe 
misunderstanding of how an intercultural community of scholars works. In the west-
ern tradition, our interculturality dates at least from the traveling intellectuals of the 
twelfth century, when study already required a year abroad, and Latin enabled com-
munication between ideas of very different provenance. That tradition borrowed from 
the Islamic system of colleges, dating from the eighth century; it has consistently 
survived attempts to locate intellectuals at national courts or to have universities work 
exclusively for nation states. Our academic distance has been very hard-won in 
political terms. Our institutions are considerably older and wider than most nation 
states. They will certainly outlive the outrageous injustices of our day. They are not 
easily dismissed. Their own particular interculturality is worth preserving. 
That kind of intellectual community carries the weight of history. Thanks to its 
principles, there can be no excuse for the collective exclusion of scholars simply by 
virtue of their national affi liation. 
Our own globalization requires at least that ethical stance. There is a fi nal irony, 
however. Those who would apply an exclusive nationalism are now, in a classical fuite 
en avant, at the forefront of the International Association of Translation and 
Intercultural Studies. For that reason, I am unable to participate in that association. 
At this point, among others, globalization requires strong decisions. 
To work on translation involves engaging with principles about relations between 
cultures, about certain aspects of globalization that allow for decisions, and thus about 
our own cultural confi guration as a research community. Those principles must be 
discovered, evaluated, modifi ed, or defended, as part of an on-going process of col-
lective refl ection. And our day-to-day political practice is the way this is done. 
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